

William Frederick Drischler

Marxist State Theory Without *Russenhass*?

A Review of Marx's Theory of the State and History in the *Revelations*, *Herr Vogt*, and *Lord Palmerston* - Tendential Inconsequentiality of Industrial Capitalism

"In the politics of Marxism,
there is no institution
which is nearly so important
as the state"

R. Milliband, *Marxism
and Politics* 1990 (1977)

The proliferation of Marxist and Neo-Marxist state theory in the English-speaking realm during the 1970's, 1980's and 1990's has been capably surveyed by C.W. Barrow in his *Critical Theories of the State: Marxist, Neo-Marxist and Post-Marxist* (1993) and is also evidenced by the work *Divided Societies: Class Struggle in Contemporary Capitalism* by Marxist-oriented state theorist R. Milliband (d. 1994).¹ Despite the unquestionable erudition of the producers of the corpus reviewed in the respective volumes, several limitations of that corpus are glaring. The extraordinary emphasis on foreign policy and anti-Russian struggle in Marx's polemics throughout his politico-literary career (as

¹ German translations are the author's unless otherwise indicated. Barrow, *Critical Theories of the State: Marxist, Neo-Marxist and Post-Marxist*, Madison, WS, 1993. Milliband, *Divided Societies. Class Struggle in Contemporary Capitalism*, Oxford, 1991 (1989). The epigram for the review is from Milliband's *Marxism and Politics*, Oxford, 1990 (1971). The edition of the *Revelations* used was that of L. Hutchinson, *Secret Diplomatic History of the 18th Century and The Story of the Life of Lord Palmerston*, NY 1969. References to *Revelations* or *Lord Palmerston* are to this volume. The *Herr Vogt* edition consulted was that of the 1974 *Marx-Engels-Werke (MEW)*, vol. XIV; there is also a **MEGA**² (*Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe*) edition (1984). The only English translation of *Herr Vogt* cited is that of R.A. Archer, *Herr Vogt: A Spy in the Workers' Movement*, London, 1982. The edition of Marx's *The Eastern Question* (E. Marx-Averling and E. Averling, editors) is the Burt Franklin reprint, NY 1968 (1897). All references to *The New York Tribune* are to this edition. A recent German edition of *The Eastern Question* is *Russlands Drang nach Westen. Der Krimkrieg und die europäische Geheimdiplomatie im 19. Jahrhundert*, cited as *Russlands Drang nach Westen* (Zürich, 1991, W. Stammeler, Editor).

well as the self-identification of the mature Marx as a specialized diplomatic historian) are largely absent. Milliband's *Divided Societies* is a rare exception in the literature in that it has a chapter on International Relations (Chapter Six, "The International Dimension of Class Struggle"). Unfortunately, said chapter consists of a quite general sketch of 20th-century history, one which integrates nothing from Marx's vast inventory of concepts in diplomatic history such as East-West collaboration and struggle, unity of covert and overt diplomacy, remote historical causation of modern state structures, ethnic peculiarity of Russian interventionism in the West and the specificity of espionage policies. Milliband's contentions that Russian expansionism is both a myth and far from malevolent are also galaxies removed from Marx's position. Barrow fares rather better than Milliband's work in the respect that he discusses nothing related to diplomacy and foreign policy in the literature on the state - in this regard faithfully reflecting most of the works under review.

Definitely connected to the neglect of diplomacy and foreign policy in recent English-language Marxist state theory is: philological indifference. Neither Barrow's work nor Milliband's 1989 book makes reference to the *Marx-Engels-Werke* (MEW) or the *Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe* (MEGA), be it the MEGA¹ or MEGA², not to forget leading Marxology journals such as the *Beiträge zur Marx-Engels-Forschung* (Berlin) or the *MEGA-Studien* (Amsterdam). In this respect too, the works accurately reflect the overall trend in Anglo-Saxon state theory.

Finally, it may be noted that Barrow and Milliband failed to encounter (or at least report on) several of Marx's writings on diplomacy and the state: the *Revelations, Herr Vogt and Lord Palmerston* (1856). In the discussion that follows, an attempt will be made to remedy these startling omissions. The exposition of Marx's discoveries and ideas regarding state theory and diplomacy has been organized around two rubrics: tendential inconsequentiality of industrial capitalism; and *Russenhass*. Tendential inconsequentiality of industrial capitalism refers to Marx's assertion of historically remote causality in the generation of state forms, i.e., that decisive aspects of the modern Western diplomatico-state structure were generated prior to industrial capitalism. This is important since it radically undermines contentions that state theory is a mere appurtenance to the critique of capitalist political economy. If many of the most important features of the modern capitalist state are clearly pre-capitalist in origin, then the limits of the

critique of capitalist political economy as a guide to state theory are pronounced indeed.

Russenhass ('hatred toward Russians') may also require some clarification since the German *Hass* has about the same connotations and denotations as the English 'hate', i.e., may imply the presence of irrational, highly emotive or even neo-racialist sentiments. In the reviewer's previous work Marx's political analysis was described as 'Russocentric'², but this, like 'Russo-antithetical' may be too understated to convey the depth of Marx's engagement with Russia. 'Russophobic' definitely won't do, since 'phobia' is a false fear; seeking to label Marx a victim of 'Russophobia' (as Max Rubel did³) would obstruct investigation of his claims as to the extent (and perniciousness) of Russian influence in the world, that is, beg the question. 'Russia-fixated' wouldn't be too bad as a description of Marx's approach to the state, except that like 'Russophobic' (though not to the same degree) 'Russia-fixated' suggests an emotional disorder, as in the French *idée fixe*. 'Russia-preoccupied' is not completely adequate, since it implies the interest in Russia is something of a hobby or passing fancy, like wood carving or flying a kite. Under all the circumstances, *Russenhass* is the best term to describe the intensive interest in and violent antipathy toward Russia in the state theory of Marx that unfolds in the *Revelations*, *Herr Vogt* and *Lord Palmerston* as well; what's more, the term has the advantage of issuing from Marx's mother tongue.

Marx's *Russenhass* is so obvious it could hardly escape the attention of serious biographers besides Max Rubel. Thus R. Friedenthal in 1981 noted that Marx was an inveterate 'Russia-hater' (*Russenhasser*).⁴ Unfortunately the biographers have often tended to treat this as primarily a subjective predisposition, an eccentric personality trait or peccadillo; in the following an attempt will be made to depict it as at the heart of the state theory. So thoroughgoing is the integration of the 'Tartars' (one of his numerous words of denigration for the Russians) inside the capitalist state for Marx that his state

² See W.F. Drischler, "Marx's Best Polemic: Russo-Napoleonism and the Italian Question in *Herr Vogt*", in *Beiträge zur Marx-Engels Forschung. Neue Folge 1994*, esp. Reference 3.

³ M. Rubel, editor, *Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels zur russischen Revolution*, Munich, 1984 (1972), p. 287. Rubel comments that '... Marx and Engels struggled against Russian absolutism with a passion that can only be described as Russophobia until the ends of their lives.'

⁴ R. Friedenthal, *Karl Marx*, Munich, 1983 (1981), p. 599. Friedenthal notes further that often Marx would not suffer Russians near his person, this for fear they were (for practical purposes) all spies.

theory may be generally designated: 'the Tataro-Capitalist state'. This concept describes the phenomenon of institutionalized Russian co-rule inside the capitalist state.

Narrative procedure for the review as a whole will be as follows. in Part One, 'The Tataro-Capitalist State According to Marx', observations about or summaries from the main themes of Russian co-rule inside industrial capitalism (the Russocentricity of Marx's state concept - *Russenhass*) and remote historical constitution of the capitalist state will be made. Once remote historical generation and specifically (ethnically) Russian character of the modern industrial state are thematized, Part Two will render judgements on the 1970's 'Derivation Literature' debate in Germany over which texts of Marx best serve as a guide to his theory of the state. Part Three, 'English-Language Marxist State Theory in Light of the Concept of the Tataro-Capitalist State', critically reviews state theory in the Anglo-Saxon realm. Finally, the Conclusion takes issue with Barrow's view that a Russia-free paradigm of Marxist state theory is possible. Appendices highlight: aspects of Marx's model of Russian co-rule in his homeland, Prussia; implications of Marx's anti-Russian agitation for the discussion of political organizations; and, finally, the treatment of the British industrial capitalist state in *Kapital I*.

PART ONE: THE TATARO-CAPITALIST STATE ACCORDING TO MARX

I. The *Revelations* and *Herr Vogt* are Companions Texts, Integrated with *Lord Palmerston* and the *New York Tribune* Articles

So much can be garnered from Marx's reference note in Chapter 7 of *Herr Vogt*: "Urquhart's writings on Russia and against Palmerston interested me but did not convince me. In order to reach a definitive view I subjected [...] the diplomatic Blue Books of 1807 to 1850 to a painstaking analysis. The first fruit of these studies was a series of articles in the '*New York Tribune*' (end of 1853) in which I demonstrated Palmerston's connection with the Russian cabinet from his transactions in Poland, Turkey, Circassia, etc. ... the '*Glasgow Sentinel*' had also printed one of these articles (Palmerston and Poland') [...]"

The Old Moor concludes by revealing that: "While researching into the diplomatic manuscripts in the British Museum I discovered series of English documents stretching back from the end of the Eighteenth Century to the period of Peter the Great, which reveal the constant and secret collaboration between the cabinets of London and St. Petersburg and make it appear that this collaboration was born in the age of Peter the Great. Of a detailed work

on this subject I have as yet only had the introduction printed, under the title 'Revelations of the Diplomatic History of the 18th Century' [...]"⁵

The latter passage has import above and beyond proving the *Revelations* is integrated with *Herr Vogt* and the various attacks upon Palmerston's political Russophilia; most of Marx's state theory appears *in nuce*. 'Secret and permanent collaboration' between the cabinets at London and St. Petersburg suggests: East-West collusion; the unity of covert and overt diplomacy (this owing to the fact some diplomacy is always overt and hence complements 'secret' diplomacy⁶); institutionalized Russian intervention in the West; world-wide Russian influence (since 'Britannia ruled the waves' in the 18th and 19th centuries); specific espionage practices (since permanent 'secret' diplomacy must have institutional means of expression); and the existence of diplomatic 'deep' structures which persist despite changing political economies and events which might be construed as non-collusive, i.e. the Crimean War.⁷ Utterly decisive is the definitive dating of the state structure as operative during the period of Peter the Great (period of the Great Northern War, 1700-21), a full and complete century before industrial capitalism was seen anywhere yet determinative of state policy in the industrial capitalist Britain in 1860. Here one sees the concept of tendential inconsequentiality of capitalism pursued with a vengeance. The implication is that industrialization in Britain has remarkably slight influence on the state structure, particularly in light of inflated claims that industrial capitalism created a state virtually *ex nihilo*.⁸ Marx's authentically conservative interpretation of history emphasizes the radical continuity of Western state structures over the centuries (as well as their integration with pre-Western state structures from Asia). Virtually the

⁵ From *Herr Vogt: A Spy in the Workers' Movement*, London, 1982, p. 101. Marx's German terms for Russo-capitalist cooperation used in *Herr Vogt* include *Zusammenhang* ('collaboration') and *Zusammenwirken* ('working together'); the English word used in *Lord Palmerston* (p. 215) is 'connivance'. Thus, according to Marx's concept of the Tataro-Capitalist state, capitalist mode of production elements and Russo-Asiatic mode of production elements meet in that state to cooperate, collaborate, work together and connive.

⁶ Marx's exact terminology for the unity of covert and overt diplomacy (*Lord Palmerston*, p. 207) is the unity of 'secret enfeoffment to Russia' with an 'official alliance with Russia'.

⁷ The editors of *Russlands Drang nach Westen* express surprise that Marx considers the Crimean War (1853-56) to be no evidence against his thesis of Anglo-Russian diplomatic connivance. In *The Fall of Kars* (1856) Marx documented his contention that Russian elements in the British state connived to sabotage the Allied war effort in the Crimea.

⁸ For a typical argument that industrialization had a broader impact on state structure than quasi-secret diplomatic currents, see R. Milliband, *Capitalist Democracy in Britain*, Oxford, 1982, p. 21.

only major aspect of Marx's diplomatico-state theory not present in this passage from *Herr Vogt* is detailed ethnic identification of the Russians, a task effectuated above all in the *Revelations*, as will be seen.

II. Marx Looked Upon Lord Palmerston as Occupying the Pinnacle of State and Politics in Great Britain

Although Palmerston's influence in the capitalist state of Marx's day is undeniable, this for all purposes commonplace must be documented as a contention of the Old Moor, since it is part of the two-step process of identifying Marx's state theory as one of Russian co-rule. The contention of the presence of Russian co-rule inside the capitalist state, it should be emphasized, goes far beyond the mere assertion substantial Russian influence is at hand. As an evidentiary matter, something on the order of a long-term head of state collaborating with the Russians *in extenso* would be required to demonstrate actual co-rule. Regarding the duration, breadth and depth of Palmerston's rule, Marx notes in *Lord Palmerston* that: "[...] a septuagenarian, and since 1807 occupying the public state almost without interruption, he contrives to remain a novelty [...] If he were to die tomorrow, all England would be surprised to learn that he had been Secretary of State half this century [...] A country like England allows him, of course, to busy himself in every corner of the earth. [...] Lord Palmerston disposed as absolutely of the Foreign Office, as if he was himself the autocrat of Great Britain."⁹

So much for the first step in identifying Marx's state theory as one of Russian co-rule (establishing Palmerston's enormous influence). Let us move on to establishing Palmerston's agency status vis-a-vis the Russo-Mongols.

III. Marx Looked Upon Lord Palmerston as a Russian Agent in the British State

Marx's most renowned characterization of the British Prime Minister as a Russian agent occurs in *Lord Palmerston* (p. 174), wherein Henry John

⁹ *Lord Palmerston*, pp. 166-67 and p. 231. In Chapter VI, "The Age of Palmerston" of the standard work *England in the Nineteenth Century*, London, 1978 (1950), D. Thomson wrote (pp. 120-21) that 'Between Peel's resignation in 1846 and the Second Reform Bill in 1867 [p]olitics were dominated ... by the most characteristically mid-Victorian statesman of all - Lord Palmerston (1784- 1865) ... He held office as Foreign Secretary under Lord Grey (1830-4), Lord Melbourne (1834 and 1835-41), Lord John Russell (1846-51); as Home Secretary under Lord Aberdeen (1852-5); and as Prime Minister (1855-8 and 1859-65). So there were only five years during this whole generation when Palmerston was not in power in an important office. It is, indeed, the Age of Palmerston.

Temple III is described as 'the unflinching and persevering advocate of Russian interests'. Even more penetrating however is Marx's analysis in *Herr Vogt*: "During the thirty years of his rule over England, *Lord Palmerston* sought at any rate to occasionally prettify his vassalage to Russia (*Vasallentum unter Russland*) with his antipathy towards Austria." (p. 493) 'Vassalage' is a fascinating term here, since it implies a conscious oath of fealty, i.e., service, homage, subordination, etc. As he was wont to do, Marx here combines both steps of his theory of Russian co-rule inside the capitalist state, that is, emphasizes both the prone position of the Imperial British political directorate in relation to the Russo-Asians and Palmerston's pinnacular role in that directorate ('his' rule over England). In any case, these two statements by Marx are summaries (not proofs) of Palmerston's role. Proofs of Palmerston's status are provided - Marx claims - by the analyses in mentions in Chapter 7 of *Herr Vogt*, namely 'transactions in Poland, Turkey, Circassia, etc.'. Such analyses focus upon overt diplomacy but as was already claimed, Marx contends there is a critically important covert side as well. In fact the Palmerston phenomenon in Marxian state theory raises the question of the role of espionage history in that theory. In *Herr Vogt* Marx displays specialized expertise as an espionage historian, producing vivid portraits of such spies as Carl Vogt, Joseph Crämer and Edouard Simon, as well as providing data on his ancient espionage nemesis, Dr. Wilhelm Stieber. In light of all this, some brief comments on Palmerston's relation to espionage might be in order.

Palmerston and the Lievens. In *Lord Palmerston* (p. 175) Marx refers to 'Prince Lieven', as he referred to Prince Lieven in the *New York Tribune* article of July 14, 1853 and to 'Princess Lieven' (also known as Countess Lieven and Madam Lieven) in the *New York Tribune* article of April 11, 1853. In the March 10, 1855 contribution to the same paper ('Russian diplomatists') Marx discussed the Russian Mission in London during Palmerston's ascendancy, describing said Mission as 'then under the direction of Count Lieven, or rather that of his wife, still in so many ways celebrated as the Princess de Lieven.' Christofer Andreevič Lieven (1774-1839) was the Russian ambassador at London from 1812 to 1834. Count (later Prince) Lieven was in this capacity assisted by his wife, Princess Lieven, *nee* Dorothea Beckendorff, the sister of the Director of the Czarist Third Section (political police) and espionage trainee as early as the reign of the 'Mad Czar', Paul I. Livingston (*Lord Palmerston*, p. 147) summarizes in this way: "Following the fashion of Regency aristocrats, Palmerston kept two

mistresses, in a *menage a trois*. They were both married: Emily Lamb to Earl Cowper and the Princess Lieven to the Russian ambassador ... The Princess Lieven was [...] not merely the wife of the Russian ambassador but a Russian spy in her own right. According to [...] David Urquhart [...] the Princess came to Palmerston's financial rescue by providing him with twenty thousand pounds of the czar's money [...] The Princess rather tactlessly fell into the habit of referring to him [Palmerston] as 'our minister' [...]"

Biographer D. Judd portrays the situation rather more discretely in his *Palmerston* "Madame de Lieven, the intelligent and scheming wife of the Russian ambassador, commended him [Palmerston] to [Lord] Grey, to whom she was very close; her advocacy of Palmerston for the Foreign Office may have owed something to the fact they had almost certainly been lovers at one time, but it is more likely that she was satisfied that he would bring pro-Russian sentiments to the post."¹⁰

After Judd bills Palmerston's arrangement of living openly with Md. de Lieven for years as 'they had almost certainly been lovers at one time', one wonders about the woman's 'very close' relation to (Prime Minister) Grey. In any case, Marx's decision to repeatedly refer to the Lievens in the context of developing his theory of the Tataro-Capitalist state appears to have been quite a sound one. The Lievens' activities are convincing evidence of Palmerston's political bias - it is difficult to imagine what better evidence that Palmerston was in bed with the Russians would look like. It might also be mentioned that Marx's distinctive method in *Herr Vogt*, that is, integrating espionage history with state theory, has been little emulated by friend or foe since.

¹⁰ D. Judd, *Palmerston*, with an Introduction by A.J.P. Taylor, London, 1975, p. 40. The third member of Palmerston's *menage a trois* with the wife of the Russian ambassador, Lady Cowper (later Lady Palmerston - sister of two-time Prime Minister Lord Melbourne) had her own politically Russophile credentials, having established a liason with Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian ambassador at London from 1835 to 1839. Even more interesting, as Judd (p. 22) recounts, were Lady Cowper's activities in managing Almack's, a London dance hall for Russian spies and British aristocracy frequented by Palmerston. Seven Lady Patronesses carefully screened applicants to the 'club', including Lady Cowper and - prima unter pares - Md. de Lieven. Palmerston's memories of the place were so fond that he arranged to have the founding meeting of the Liberal Party (6 June 1859) held on the same premises (rechristened Willis's Rooms) in St. James Street. It was a seemly venue for the Russophiles Palmerston, Lord John Russell and John Bright to combine with Gladstone to 'do something about Italy', that is to say, support Napoleon III's Russo-Napoleonism. For another discussion of the meeting at Willis's Rooms, see P. Adelman, *Gladstone, Disraeli and Later Victorian Politics*, Second Edition, Essex UK, 1991, p. I.

IV. In the *Revelations* Marx Claims That Remote Constitution of the British Capitalist State Extends Back to the Tartar Yoke in Russia (1241-1480)

However striking Marx's formulation in *Herr Vogt* that Anglo-Russian diplomacy 'was born in the age of Peter the Great', said formulation is a mere foretaste of his contentions concerning the antiquity of the Russo-Asiatic mode of production elements co-ruling inside the British industrial capitalist state. Such forces - it is averred - acquired their distinct political physiognomy during the Tartar Yoke in Russia, that is, during the imposition of Oriental modes of statecraft from the Yuan (Mongol) and Liao dynasties in China (consolidation of the Kipjak Khanate over Moscow - rule of the Golden Horde). Questions concerning long-run Sino-Mongol influence over Russia are perennial ones in Russian history; it cannot be the intent of the present review to reconstruct that discussion. The sole concern here is to undergird the representation that for Marx the critique of political economy is not the main guide to state theory. Marx writes in the *Revelations* that: "The bloody mire of Mongolian slavery forms the cradle of Muscovy, and modern Russia is but a metamorphosis of Muscovy. The Tartar Yoke lasted [...] more than two centuries; a yoke not only crushing, but dishonouring and withering its prey. [...] The Tartar Yoke had already lasted a hundred years before Muscovy emerged from its obscurity." (p. 111)

The key phrase in all likelihood here is 'modern Russia is but a metamorphosis of Muscovy', since when taken in combination with the assertion Muscovy took definitive shape a century after the imposition of the Yoke (mid-1400's), the theory holds the Russian state-form was up and running two and a half centuries before Peter the Great's ascendancy in 1700 and more than three and one half centuries before industrial capitalism evolved and - equally important - merely experienced metamorphosis while the essence remained firmly intact. The *Revelations* again emphasizes extraordinary continuity in Russian state policy when it is written: "A simple substitution of names and dates will prove to evidence that between the policy of Ivan III., and that of modern Russia, there exists not similarity but sameness." (p. 120)

Marx's radically conservative, repeated assertions that there was nothing really new in Russian history since the Tartars rode their ponies out of Muscovy and back to Far Eastern Asia in the latter half of the fifteenth century, was rejected by **MEGA**¹ founder D. B. Rjazanov in March of 1909.¹¹ Writing in a supplementary edition of K. Kautsky's *Neuen Zeit*, Rjazanov

¹¹ D.B. Rjazanov, "Karl Marx ueber den Ursprung der Vorrherrschaft Russlands in Europa" (1909), in Ulf Wolter, editor, *Die Geschichte der Geheimdiplomatie des 18. Jahrhunderts*, Berlin, 1977.

found Marx's innuendo of extreme cultural stationariness of the Russian people unpalatable and the Russian did his best to dissipate that innuendo. Whatever the merits of Rjazanov's revisionist efforts to rebut Marx, he perceived Marx's allegation of extraordinarily archaic (i.e., undeniably pre-capitalist) input into Western Europe from Russia (especially industrial capitalist Britain) correctly. Rjazanov's inquiry confirmed that for Marx, remote constitution of the British capitalist state extends back to the Tartar Yoke in Russia.

V. In the *Revelations* Marx Asserts That the Peculiarity of the Russians is Their Capacity to Absorb Western Innovations While Preserving Archaic Institutions and Mores

The significance of this concept for state theory is simple: it explains how an in critical respects static Russian Oriental despotism could co-exist inside a far more dynamic industrial capitalist state in Britain. Marx avers that: "If the Muscovite Czars [...] were obliged to tartarize Muscovy, Peter the Great [...] was obliged to civilize Russia. In grasping upon the Baltic provinces, he seized at once the tools necessary for this process. [...] they yielded him [...] a crop of bureaucrats, schoolmasters, and drill-sergeants, who were to drill Russians into that varnish of civilization that adapts them to the technical appliances of the Western peoples, without imbuing them with their ideas." (*Revelations*, p. 125)

It is the *viability* of this 'drillmaster' strategem of Peter the Great (on Marx's view) that makes Russian co-rule inside the capitalist state possible and the survival of Russian despotism into the industrial era a reality. In this quote (as throughout the *Revelations*) it is 'Russians' who are the object of scrutiny. Marx here (as in other works) eschews the vague abstraction of 'Czarism' to focus on the concrete (multiply-mediated) specificity of the Russians as an ethnic-national group. Such ethnic focus was unavoidable for a state theory which posited 'constant, secret collaboration' between the Russian capital and the leading industrial, commercial and political capital of the West. That Marx's concept from *Herr Vogt* of 'Anglo-Russian diplomacy' (p. 474) suggests cultural affinities between the 'Tartars' and the English-speaking peoples should go without saying. What was in any case critically important for the development of the capitalist state structure (according to this theory) was the utterly peculiar capacity of the Russians to absorb modern technical innovations while remaining clearly outside the Western family of nations, the group Marx called the 'Western peoples of culture' (*westliche Kulturvölker*).

The exposition of the theory of the Tataro-Capitalist state given here tried to follow the order in which Marx in Chapter 7 of *Herr Vogt* claimed he developed it, that is to say, he was first interested in anti-Palmerston agitation by Urquhart, then conducted his own research on Palmerston's policies, then uncovered information on Petrine diplomacy and finally integrated the Tartar Yoke into the theory as a whole, the latter event paving the way for a definitive position on Peter the Great. It would be folly to assert this version of the pristine Marxian state theory is the object of a broad consensus of state theorists. The underlying assumption of the exposition of the Tataro-Capitalist state theory - that the political writings of Marx (and Engels) take precedence over the critique of capitalist political economy when looking for textual sources for Marxist state theory - is in fact a matter of considerable dispute. Furthermore, the Tataro-Capitalist state concept bears little resemblance to much of what is perceived as Marxist state theory in the English-speaking world. Let us take these problems in turn, starting with the question of from which group of texts Marxist state theory is properly 'derived'.

PART TWO: THE 'DERIVATION LITERATURE' DEBATE IN GERMANY IN THE 1970'S - WHICH GROUP OF TEXTS BEST SERVES AS THE SOURCE FOR STATE THEORY?

In a fashion similar to English-language Marxist state theory, the German discussion benefited from the erosion of Cold War ideology and the re-emergence of mass movements in the 1960's to become a 'going concern' in the 1970's. The German debate was dissimilar to the English-language variant in that the participants had access to all the Marxian texts (many being untranslated) and this factor in turn imparted a special character to the controversies. In the analysis of state theory in the article "The Political Thought of Marxism" (in: *Politische Philosophiedes 20. Jahrhunderts*¹²), K.G. Ballestrem characterized the debate over texts as follows: "The book on the State which Marx had planned within the framework of his critique of political economy [MEW, vol. 13, p. 7] was never written. He who would nevertheless seek to understand and interpret Marxist state theory must choose between two paths: either to distill from disparate texts texts - above all the political writings - the essential insights (as I have rudimentarily sought to do here); or: to reconstruct Marx's theory of the bourgeois state from the

¹² K.G. Ballestrem and H. Ottman, editors, *Politische Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts*, Munich, 1990, p. 152.

principles of the critique of political economy (as occurred in the so-called 'Derivation Literature' [*Ableitungsliteratur*] in the 1970's.)."

Though some confusion results from the fact 'derivation' (*Ableitung*) is used both to describe the question as to sources for state theory and to describe a particular direction (*Ableitungsliteratur* - the political economy direction), the bifurcation of political writings from political economy is clear. Stakes were high since the 'political writings' direction could lead straight to *Herr Vogt* and Marx's diplomacy-propelled concept of the state developed in the 1850's. Like any vigorous debate, that between the political writings and political economy tendencies was based on a shared premise - namely, that Marx's polemics on the one hand and economic writings on the other were only quite partially mediated, i.e., inconsistent. This underlying reality was reflected in the most influential collection of Marxian texts on the state in the West Germany of the 1970's: *Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels. Staatstheorie* (1974)¹³. The editors (E. Hennig, et al.) divided said texts into three categories - Early-Hegelian, State and Economy, and Political Writings. It was the tension of the latter two clusters which was the chief concern of several of the scholarly introductions to the volume and in particular the Note "Criteria for Selection" written by E. Hennig to precede the Political Writings part of the collection. Hennig describes the inconsistency of the political writings and the political economy in this fashion *Staatstheorie*: "It is the goal of this selection to show that Marx and Engels, in the context of their agitational publications, were unable to 'reconcile' the problematic of systematic mediation and derivation of political events from the general concept of capital with [...] empirical multiplicity." (p. 512)

Evidence that Marx (in particular) ever *sought* to derive agitational writings from 'the general concept of capital' is rather paucid, especially since so much of his agitational writings dealt with Russia (which featured the Asiatic mode

¹³ E. Hennig, J. Hirsch, H. Reichelt and G. Schäfer, editors, *Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels. Staatstheorie. Materialien zur Rekonstruktion der marxistischen Staatstheorie*, Frankfurt/Main, Berlin, Vienna, 1979 (1974). Hereinafter, *Staatstheorie*. The usual generalization concerning the capitalist state advanced by proponents of deriving its function from political economy - namely that the state's chief purpose is to enhance conditions for reproduction of the capital-labour relation - is sufficiently general to encompass diplomatic policies including *sub rosa* (and *supra rosa*) compacts with the Russians. But it is *too* general to accommodate the quite emphatic emphasis on the 'Russian aspect' of the capitalist state made by Marx; the Russians are likely better conceived as a distinct second party, i.e., part of a three-way relation with capital and the state. In any case the concept of the Tataro-Capitalist state in Marx is in significant part grounded in cultural anthropology. The core idea is trans-cultural symbiosis of Asian authoritarianism and 'productionist' market institutions from the West.

of production rather than the capitalist mode of production). Cognition of this state of affairs on the part of the *Staatstheorie* editors might have been higher if they had not conducted a minuet around Marx's Russia writings - Palmerston is mentioned about once and *Herr Vogt* is cited about once. But the philological/methodological *factum brutum* that the political economy and political writings are not consistent comes through quite readily in the selections and introductions; indeed, as one juncture (p. LXXXIV) Hennig states flatly that 'The empirical reality ... of the bourgeois state can not be deduced from the concept of capital in general.' Such methodological rigor is of great use in pointing students of state theory toward the political writings and then to the anti-Russian writings, i.e., breaking up the *conspiration de silence* against Russenfass in Marx's state theory. The conspiracy has been if anything even more pronounced in the Anglo-Saxon literature than in the Central European discussion, and it is to the former we now turn.

PART THREE: ENGLISH-LANGUAGE MARXIST STATE THEORY IN LIGHT OF THE CONCEPT OF THE TATARO-CAPITALIST STATE

Major sources for this survey were Barrow's *Critical Theory of the State* and Milliband's works. Also topical is the prolix anti-Marxist diatribe *The Immanent Utopia: From Marxism on the State to the State of Marxism* by A. van den Berg (1988)¹⁴, a less-focused discussion of the same material as Barrow (and other material as well). Van den Berg evinces no knowledge of Marx's Russia writings but goes on to discuss Marxism and Russia anyway, the same procedure as H. Marcuse in his *Soviet Marxism* (1958). Be all that as it may, *The Immanent Utopia* may serve as a supplementary account of English-language Marxist state theory for those who find Barrow's work too concise.

The period sought to be covered here is the one of decisive structuration of leftist state theory, namely from the late 1960's to the mid-1970's. Those seeking information on the follow-up debates may consult *Critical Theories of the State*, Chapters Three to Five. Regarding the 'heroic period', several generalizations may readily be made. As to method (regarding texts), the major figures related to Marxism may be characterized as practitioners of Russo-evasive Eclecticism or Russo-evasive Smorgasbord. The Marxian texts were treated like a smorgasbord to be raided helter-skelter to address certain problems, yet an overarching ideological imperative guided the entire

¹⁴ A. van den Berg, *The Immanent Utopia. From Marxism on the State to the State of Marxism*, Princeton NJ, 1988.

discussion: evasion of *Russenhass*. Neither Barrow, Milliband's works cited, nor van den Berg ever arrive at a discussion of Marx's diplomatico-historical model of the state from the 1850's. As will be seen, problems of method in Marxology have real importance since many (if not most) of the holes in this variant of state theory originate in the blackout of the Russian dimension.

Regarding the three main tendencies contributing to developments - Instrumentalist Marxism, anti-Marxist Pluralism and the Relative Autonomy school - two further generalizations may be made. Firstly, most of the criticisms the various tendencies directed at one another were valid. Secondly - and more importantly - all three directions failed seriously to take into account the presence of extra-Western forces integrated into the capitalist state and co-determining its policies and evolution. All the tendencies are simply and clearly guilty of analytic Occidental chauvinism, that is, guilty of assuming no extra-Western forces had the wherewithal to play a major role *inside* the Western state. This (erroneous) assumption is not merely the chief limitation of English-language Marxist state theory; it is the chief limitation of political studies overall in the Occident since World War II.

The renaissance of Marxist studies throughout the advanced industrialized countries during the 1960's took hold in the English-speaking realm as well. As cracks and fissures began opening in Cold War ideology, the essential precondition for systematic state theory - opportunities to integrate substantial portions of Marx's work - was present. Regretably, spadework for Marxist state theory was rather modest. Aside from producers of epigonal/neo-hagiographic commentaries on the Marxian classics and the producers of Kautsky translations, the main figures were Marxist-oriented historian of political ideas Harold J. Laski (d. 1950), denizen of the London School of Economics and a leader of the British Labour Party; Paul M. Sweezy (b. 1900), a Harvard-educated political economist and student of Laski; and Texas-born, self-styled Plain Marxist political sociologist C. Wright Mills (d. 1962). Appropriately enough, it would be a protégé of Laski, confidante of Mills and colleague of Sweezy - Belgium-born state theorist Ralph Milliband - who would produce one of the two works which decisively shaped the first stage of the resurgence of Marxist state theory in the English-speaking world: *The State in Capitalist Society*¹⁵. Far more surprising was the other main contributor: University of California at Santa Cruz Psychology Professor and Dream Theory specialist G. William Domhoff, author of *Who*

¹⁵ R. Milliband, *The State in Capitalist Society*, London, 1969. References to Milliband are to this volume.

*Rules America?*¹⁶ and a spate of later works. Though Milliband abandoned the label (and Domhoff disavowed it), this first distinct tendency became known as 'Instrumentalist Marxism'. The main object of analysis was the structure of the public authority in the leading capitalist power - the North-American U.S. - and after that Britain and the other Western industrial powers.

Instrumentalism and Pluralism. Domhoff's *Who Rules America?* had as its departure point Kautsky's maxim that 'the ruling class rules but it does not govern' under capitalism, that is, most members of the capitalist upper/ruling class do not themselves conduct political affairs (except at selected apogees of decision-making). Domhoff renamed Kautsky's ruling class 'the governing class'. The social science method of *Who Rules America?*, one common to North American social scientists of varying persuasions, is known as power structure research. As Barrow describes it (pp. 17-18) '... for power structure analysts, the key objective is to determine whether corporate owners and managers constitute a coherent ruling class, or whether they are simply a loose agglomeration of privileged special interests'. For Domhoff the former is true; Barrow concludes (p. 13) that 'Thus, instrumentalist theory offers a straightforward and simple claim that the modern state serves the interests of the capitalist class because it is dominated by that class.' Domhoff himself defines that class as 'a social upper class which owns a disproportionate amount of a country's wealth, receives a disproportionate amount of a country's yearly income, and contributes a disproportionate number of its members to the controlling institutions and key decision-making groups of the country.' (*Who Rules America?*, p. 5). Milliband's ruling class in *The State in Capitalist Society* is quite similar to Domhoff's governing class, that is, a 'class which owns and controls the means of production and which is able, by virtue of the economic power thus conferred upon it, to use the state as its instrument for the domination of society' (p. 23). There are some differences between the two works; Domhoff likes to 'name names' and identify institutions (such as the Council on Foreign Relations - CFR) and investigate specific governmental decisions; the Milliband of *The State in Capitalist Society* was more prone to 'theorizing' about the state and displayed more interest in what could be called *Weltanschauung* conditioning ('a process of massive indoctrination', p. 164) by the state than investigating decision-making. But both parties agreed the capitalist ruling class was a cohesive and self-conscious group wielding the state as its own instrument in a successful project to rule market society as a whole.

¹⁶ G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America?*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1967.

Though more coherently formulated than its predecessors, 'Instrumentalist' Marxism as a positive account of the state did not represent any major analytic or theoretic innovations vis-à-vis the earlier work of Sweezy or C. Wright Mills.¹⁷ The lasting influence of Instrumentalism came from another source entirely: the presence of a large, slow-moving target against which to launch polemical broadsides. This target was the dominant paradigm of North American political studies, referred to alternatively as Behaviorism, Liberal Pluralism or simply Pluralism. Although rooted in (corporate) foundation-sponsored research at what Upton Sinclair called The Rockefeller University of Chicago in the 1920's, Pluralism came into its own during the Cold War 1950's as the dominant perspective in North American political science. Leaders of the school included Robert A. Dahl, Charles E. Lindblom and Nelson Polsby. The definitive statement of the group was considered to be Dahl's *Who Governs?* (1961)¹⁸. Pluralists understood themselves to be in opposition to 'institutional' theorists left over from the 'Red '30s'. The methodically-pursued goal was to depict state power as highly dispersed; dispersed on as many levels and amongst as many different interest groups as possible. If power were concentrated nowhere, then it certainly couldn't be concentrated in the hands of the capitalists. As Victorians avoided the term 'belly' (especially in relation to a female) and anarchists avoided the term (and concept of authority, Pluralists avoided the concept (and reality) of domination, that is, the severe limiting of life chances of one stratum of people by another. Such power as could be found in capitalist society (that is, that hadn't been dispersed entirely) was benevolently exercised for the good of all. Though influential, business groups were merely another 'interest group', checked, balanced and countervailed by veterans' associations, anti-vivisection activists and the plumbers' union. Pluralists sought to focus on actual decision-making as the nexus of analysis, as opposed to 'speculative' conceptions such as hegemony or domination. Such analysis revealed, it was maintained, an endless multiplicity of causal factors and organizations having an impact on state policy. These perceived factors were at times so numerous that some Pluralist analyses resembled lists, with little sifting of the essential from the non-essential. As C.B. MacPherson noted, the 18th century model of competitive capitalism based on small units, a model which modern economics threw out in the age of monopoly and oligopoly in the 20th

¹⁷ Antonio Negri stressed the continuity of the work of C. Wright Mills and Milliband in his 1977 *Staat in der Krise* (Berlin, Merve Verlag, p. 16).

¹⁸ Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*, New Haven CO, 1961.

century, had been plucked from the refuse bin and refurbished by political scientists in North America. C. Wright Mills dubbed the Pluralists 'Romantic Conservatives', much to the ire of school members, who liked to look upon themselves as empirical liberals.

To the Milliband of *The State in Capitalist Society* the core Pluralist thesis that all the 'interest groups' in the capitalist state compete on more or less equal terms had the limitation of being 'in all essentials wrong' (p. 6). To bracket Big Business with any 'interest group' was naive, Milliband contended. Access to political leaders inside the state, means to exert pressure from 'without' the state (i.e., solidarity with international business elements) and control of ideology and mass perceptions (mass media of information) on the part of big capital make it highly implausible to seek to depict it as just another interest group sidling over to the public trough. Other Instrumentalism-oriented critics excoriated Pluralism for misunderstanding 'two faces of power' as well as Pluralism's 'parliamentary fetishism'. The 'two faces of power' critique¹⁹ drew attention to the importance of non-issues (issues suppressed from debate concerning state policy by the ruling class or governing class/power elites), non-issues standing outside the universe of discourse for decision-fixated Pluralists. Parliamentary fetishism, that is, refusal to admit major state decisions were being made outside the legislative system (i.e., were being made by business and business-related organizations on their own) was another drawback of Pluralism brought to light. Domhoff for his part in later studies addressed the matter of the class character of principal decision-making in the capitalist state. Without conceding ground on non-issues or parliamentary fetishism, the argument was carried into the arena the Pluralists had selected for debate, passage of particular legislation in the U.S. state system. As Barrow recounts (p. 37), Pluralists had imprudently picked the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935, an example of New Deal welfare state legislation, as an example of broad-scale defeat for the capitalist class. Domhoff proved the legislation has been largely conceptualized, drafted and lobbied through the U.S. Congress by the Business Advisory Council, an organization of big capitalists and their explicitly-designated minions.

The Instrumentalist-Pluralist debate on state theory was one of the most remarkable cultural and intellectual refractions of social struggles in the 20th century, this because after losing numberless battles, the Pluralists won the

¹⁹ Bachrach, P., and Baratz, M.S., "Two Faces of Power", *American Political Science Review* 56, No. 4, 1962.

war. It turned out the state in capitalist society was not the mere instrument of the capitalist class. What's more, it was *not* the mere instrument of the capitalist class for exactly the reason spelled out by the Pluralists: a definitely non-capitalist social group could be identified which was playing a leading role in the articulation of state policy. The feckless if not pathetic character of the Pluralists' attempts to identify the non-capitalist group active inside the state apparatus tended to obscure the truth. The (quite thorough) demolition job on Pluralists' credibility performed by Domhoff et al. had the counter-productive effect of hiding the genuine nature of the state in capitalist society, namely one of 'relative autonomy' from the capitalists. In fact a concession to Pluralists, clarification of the matter came from inside the ranks of Marxist state theory in the early 1970's.

Relative Autonomy. The second stage in the renewed development of English-language Marxist state theory will be forever linked to the work of Nicos Poulantzas (d. 1979) and his concept of 'relative autonomy of the capitalist state (or 'state autonomy')'. In the volume *Political Power and Social Classes* (1973)²⁰ Poulantzas sought to polemicize against 'a simplistic and vulgarized conception which sees in the state the tool or instrument of the dominant class', adding that 'Our task therefore is to [...] show that the conception of the state in general as a simple tool or instrument of the dominant class, erroneous even in its generality, is particularly useless for grasping the function of the capitalist state.' For Poulantzas the authentically monolithic (or 'monistic') cohesion on the part of the capitalist class which would be required to wield that state as an 'instrument' was non-existent. In order to assure long-run survival of the economic system, the state needed autonomy to play the role of mediator (or broker) so as to prevent dominant classes (note the plural 'dominant classes') and capital factions from wrecking everything through unbridled competition and other social antagonisms. No shrinking violet, Poulantzas engaged in a sharp exchange with Milliband concerning state theory in 1973 in the pages of the London *New Left Review*. After being challenged by Milliband to specify 'how relative is the relative autonomy of the state', Poulantzas replied: "I can give no general answer - not, as Milliband believes, because I take no account of concrete individuals or the role of social classes, but precisely because the term 'relative' in the expression 'relative autonomy' of the state (relative in relation to what or whom) here

²⁰ N. Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, London, 1976 (1973). The French original: *Pouvoir politique et classes sociales*, Paris, 1968.

refers to the relationship between state and dominant classes, (i.e., relatively autonomous in relation to the dominant classes)."²¹

By recognizing the existence of dominant classes (as opposed to the Instrumentalists' unitary capitalist class) Poulantzas moved the debate forward significantly. Even though Relative Autonomy agreed with Instrumentalism that the state in capitalist society served the long-run interests of the capitalists, it provided a definitely more complex bases to understand the real differences at the pinnacle of state and society. Methodologically, Poulantzas's approach was *functional* - the state had an imperative of mediating potential conflicts at the top, hence it was relatively autonomous. Poulantzas never acceded to Pluralist or Instrumentalist demands to clearly socially identify the actors who were administering the capitalist state in semi-autonomy from the capitalists. In addition, Poulantzas was a second-rate student of Marx. In Part IV of *Political Power and Social Classes* a detailed discussion of Marx's concept of Bonapartism was provided, a discussion conducted in apparently complete innocence of the fact Marx substantially revised the concept in *Herr Vogt*; in the latter volume Marx contends that the state in the French Third Empire was one of Russian co-rule, not (as Poulantzas believed) one of equipoise of one duration or another between contending classes. Marx's heavy emphasis on the role of Russian espionage agents in administering Napoleon III's state (see **MEW, vol. 30**) was also apparently unknown to Poulantzas. But philological gaps in Poulantzas's work do not change the fact that by recognizing more than one 'dominant class' inside the capitalist state, the author of *Political Power and Social Classes* had brought about a noteworthy improvement over Instrumentalist Marxism.

Instrumentalism, Pluralism and Relative Autonomy: A Critique

Assuming Marx's model of the Tataro-Capitalist state is directly applicable to the 20th century, an arresting critique of recent state theory can be developed. The suggestion is not so outlandish as it might seem, since the embrace of Anglo-Russian diplomacy (especially during the World Wars) was if anything more fervid in the 20th century than in the 19th. Russian diplomacy, espionage, cultural exchange programs with the West and territorial aggrandizement have been much more extensive (especially up to 1989) in the

²¹ From B. Jessop, *Nicos Poulantzas. Marxist Theory and Political Strategy*, London, 1985, p. 133.

20th century than in the 19th.²² Unquestionably, outlining Marx's 1850's state theory, testing it for the Age of Palmerston and testing it for this century are three separate projects. In previous sections of this review an attempt was made to outline the model as it was formulated and also to begin testing it for the Age of Palmerston. In this section an attempt will be made to use the model to clarify certain problems of recent Marxist state theory.

Instrumentalist Marxism and Liberal Pluralism turn out to be similar in several ways. Both ultimately pursue a one-point agenda; the former to prove the late capitalist state functions as an instrument of the capitalist class, the latter to assert it does not. There is the significant difference that Pluralists pursue their agenda more or less *sub rosa* - so much is suggested by the Pluralists' practice of discussing power and the state under rubrics such as 'dispersal' (or polyarchy), terms which (in an era of almost uncanny concentration of economic and political power) border on the disinformational. Pluralism and Instrumentalism turn out to be not similar but the same in their Occidental cultural provincialism; that an extra-Western 'dominant class' (Poulantzas) could be co-ruling inside the capitalist state seems never to have occurred to the leaders of either school. Thus cultural provincialism led directly to inability to locate the other dominant class for both schools, with the significant difference the Pluralists were conducting a frantic search to find it while Instrumentalists sincerely believed there was no need to look. In any case, despite a hidden agenda and numerous unsuccessful efforts to analytically isolate what might be designated a co-dominant class mediating the influence of capital in the state, Pluralism emerged vindicated in its rejection of Instrumentalism - paradoxically, as it were, since Marx was discovered lurking in the Pluralist camp. Marx's pluralism was of a truly iconoclastic order - that of a 'di-ist' (proponent of two and only two major groupings directing the state: capitalist mode of production elements and Russo-Asiatic mode of production elements). In the capitalist state there were, to use one of the Old Moor's favorite expressions from Shakespeare, 'two Richmonds in the field' (*Richard III*, Act 5, Scene iv; in *Herr Vogt*, p. 399. 'Two Richmonds in the field' describes a situation in which an unexpected, second opponent takes the field of battle.). But Marx's adherence to the most

²² The most famous (or most notorious) argument that Russia remained 'Asiatic' during the 20th century was advanced by K.A. Wittfogel in his *Oriental Despotism*, New Haven CO, 1957. The best argument for pronounced continuity in 19th and 20th century Russian diplomacy (and thereby state structure) was developed by H. Pächter in the volume *Weltmacht Russland*, Munich, 1970, esp. p. 17.

limited form of Pluralism possible (diism) could not change the fact his work stood aligned with Instrumentalism's chief foe.

Poulantzas's work shared several limitations with Instrumentalism. Culturally-conditioned inability to conceptualize large-scale non-Western influence in the Western state and evasion (or ignorance) of Marx's Russia writings were as prominent in Poulantzas's work as that of the Instrumentalists. Yet these handicaps did not prevent Poulantzas from outlining a plausible state theory. Over and against the Instrumentalists, Poulantzas justifiably proclaimed the 'relative autonomy' of the capitalist state vis-à-vis capital - how could it be otherwise with Russo-Asiatic mode of production elements co-ruling inside? Also over and against the Instrumentalists Poulantzas emphasized dominant classes (not a ruling class) in the capitalist state - here following Marx's meticulous procedure. Over and against the Pluralists Poulantzas correctly described the Tataro-Capitalist state as serving the long-run interests of capital - this stemming from a situation (unbeknownst to him) in which the capitalist mode of production elements and the Russo-Asiatic mode of production elements perceived their interests (and acted upon same) in near-perfect synchronization in opposition to the interests of the great majority of the members of industrial society, that is, the 'direct producers' and their families. Also over and against the Pluralists Poulantzas did not identify reams of inappropriate candidates for the co-dominant class co-ruling with capital, and he identified one of the two dominant classes (capital) correctly. Poulantzas's basic model - a relatively autonomous state, with several dominant classes co-ruling at the top which nevertheless serves the long-run interests of capital - is correct. Cultural provincialism (or political Russophilia) may have blocked Poulantzas from recovering the importance of East-West struggle in Marx's original state theory from the 1850's; that he fleshed out an often satisfactory account of the Tataro-Capitalist state in Late Capitalism anyway was a real achievement, likely the high point of Marxist state theory in the English-speaking sector since the renaissance of it began in the mid-1960's. If one takes Poulantzas's relative autonomy model, clearly limits the number of dominant classes to two, clearly specifies the non-capitalist member of the diumvirate as Russian and specifically identifies the Russian input as non-Western, a complete and satisfactory outline for a Marxist theory of the state (an outline consistent with *Herr Vogt*) is at hand. The main elements missing from Poulantzas's account (it will readily be seen) come straight out of *Russenhass* and it is to this topic we now return.

CONCLUSION: NO MARXIST STATE THEORY WITHOUT *RUSSENHASS*. A CRITIQUE OF BARROW

It was earlier suggested that Marx's *Russenhass* integrated an intensive interest in - and violent antipathy toward - Russia. Although the characterization was true so far as it went, *Russenhass* is rather more multi-faceted. Aside from embodying emotional predispositions (which all human beings have), *Russenhass* in Marx's case entails a political program to 'crush Russia' (*Herr Vogt*); an attendant philosophy of history suggesting serious possibilities of carrying out the program; and a (potentially severable) empirical description of a particular state and power structure. The net effect of such an intellectual edifice is an 'ether' which bathes Marx's state theory entirely, however little the genuine article is really known. These assertions are not at all congruent with Barrow's conclusions in *Critical Theories of the State*. Barrow begins by stating that 'the attempt to [...] clarify the state-capital relation theoretically is [...] the very basis of the entire debate within Marxist state theory' (p. 156). The consensus on this issue leads to the generalization that a paradigm in the sense of Thomas S. Kuhn is at hand, that is, an explanatory model that has a clear prospect of success in solving a significant number of the problems it poses. When this point in developing a theoretic model is reached, 'normal science' may be conducted with it until it no longer clarifies many (or any) of the problems it raises. According to Barrow, the point as Kuhn's 'normal science' has been attained in Marxist state theory. Barrow concludes: "[...] the conceptual apparatus available to the Marxian paradigm and the methodological approaches to which it is wedded make it highly unlikely at this point that there can be any further theoretical discoveries of a revolutionary nature. Quite simply, all the cards have been dealt, and this is as good as the hand will get [...]." (p. 156)

It is submitted here that discovery of *Russenhass* will be a 'theoretical' discovery of a revolutionary nature'. Using Barrow's criterion - providing clarification of the state-capital relation theoretically - *Russenhass* fits the bill as 'revolutionary' since it reveals there likely is no (and has never been) a state-capital relation but rather something else: a state/capital/Russo-Asiatic mode of production elements relation, one which compells consideration of East-West Conflict (and collusion). For the Marx of *Herr Vogt* there are always 'two Richmonds in the field', that is, two socially and culturally distinct strata inside the state, one of which does not even originate in the Western world. The (for practical purposes complete) ignorance of this state of affairs on the part of most writers of Marxist state theory leads to the

conclusion that Barrow's claim an intact paradigm for Marxist state theory is extant is unwarranted. When *Russenhass* is recognized by most state theorists who draw from Marx, some will seek to avoid it (as Eugene Kamenka did in the Introduction to *The Portable Marx*). For the conscientious majority there can be, however, no choice in the matter. One might seek to 'de-aggregate' the anti-Russian program from the empirical analysis of the double state of capitalists and Russians exposed by Marx; but the author of the theory never did. For Marx (to borrow a figure of speech from *Kapital III*), the road out of the Kingdom of Necessity into the Kingdom of Necessity is paved with Russian cadavers - and if the road's not paved, there'll be no passage.

APPENDIX: 'PRUSSIA, THE LACKEY OF THE CZAR'

MARX'S CONCEPT OF RUSSIAN CO-RULE INSIDE PRUSSIA

Marx's expression from *Lord Palmerston* (p. 189) 'Prussia, the lackey of the Czar' represented not a fortuitous calumny but a fixed habit. The Red Prussian had been bemoaning Russo-Mongol influence in his homeland since the very beginning of his career as a publicist. The very first prominent theme of Marx's contributions to the *Rheinische Zeitung* in 1842 was the (from his perspective) appalling servility of the Prussian king toward the Russians. It is highly questionable to contend Marx evolved into a 'Russia-baiter' by stages; the extraordinarily early appearance of anti-Russian themes in the agitational writings lead to the conclusion that attacking the 'Tartars' was a prime motivation for the Old Moor to get involved in politics in the first place. When invited to make a contribution on Prussian history to Ernest Jones's chartist organ *The People's Paper* in 1856, there could be little mystery concerning Marx's conclusions. A Russocentric and diplomacy-driven analysis was in the offing.

Despite complaining to Engels from Grafton Terrace, London on 2 December 1856 that his knowledge of Prussian history was 'highly deficient' (*höchst mangelhaften*), Marx soon thereafter (13 December 1856) published an article in *The People's Paper* constituting a thorough outline of Prussian history.²³

²³ Marx to Engels, 2 December 1856, in Marx/Engels. *Über Deutschland und die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung. Band 1. Von der Frühzeit bis zum 18. Jahrhundert*, Berlin, 1982, p. 599. Article on the Divine Right of the Hohenzollerns, pp. 586-92. L. Rühl, in the Afterword to *Russlands Drang nach Westen* (p. 615) describes Russian co-rule in Prussia as 'the traditional Russo-Prussian alliance', while Friedenthal (*Karl Marx*, p. 154) writes of the 'hegemony' of Russia in Prussia. Franz Mehring (*Gesammelte Schriften V*, 6th Edition, Berlin, 1988, p. 512) went so far as to state 'Prussian hegemony, in accord with its origin and essence has always been nothing but (*immer nur*) a Russian satrapy.' Mehring's analysis of Prussia as a satrap in vassalage to the domination of

Methodologically the article was nearly identical to the *Revelations* prepared about the same time in that it was diplomacy-oriented, traced the roots of state structures back to the 18th century, contained next-to-nothing on political economy (the comments on political economy in the *Revelations* were intended to illustrate its impertinence, not analyse) and asserted Russian co-rule was the single decisive aspect of the state. Focusing most specifically on partition agreements with Russia, Marx concluded by contending that the three determinative events in Prussian diplomacy were: the partition agreements with Peter the Great concerning distribution of Swedish possessions after the Great Northern War; the agreement to divide Poland made with Katherine II; and the division of Germany concluded with Czar Alexander I. The Old Moor went on to state that the Prussians had been under Russian influence for so long that they tended to acquire territories Russian-style, i.e., by bribery and intrigue rather than by conquest or some other honorable means. The essence of Prussian diplomacy (and hence the most important aspect of the Prussian state) for Marx was the policy of making partition agreements with the Russians against states which the Prussians had not brought down but which the Prussians wished to jump on after somebody else had brought them down. Under such circumstances, Marx added, 'Prussian militarism' was a preposterous myth.

Lukács Versus Marx on the Prussian State

Marx's conceptualization of Prussia can be very fruitfully clarified by contrasting it with that of Georg Lukács (1885-1971). Though known primarily as a cultural historian (among other things) rather than a political historian, in the case of Prussia Lukács crossed the line into political history proper and even produced ruminations on the 'organizational form of the state' (*staatlicher Organisationsform*) in Prussia. This occurred in the 1956 Revised Edition of the volume *Schicksalwende* ('Change in Fate').²⁴ Gone is Marx's extraordinary emphasis on the 'primacy of foreign policy' (*Primat der Aussenpolitik*) and diplomacy in the state; Lukács frames his analysis from the opposite standpoint of 'primacy of domestic policy' (*Primat der Innenpolitik*); focus is on the 'inner social structure of Prussia' (p. 334) even if occasional observations on Prussian diplomacy are unavoidable. The overall theoretic

Russian Asiatic despotism is closer to Marx's perspective than the work of the other theorists of the Second International. Engels included.

²⁴ G. Lukács, *Schicksalwende. Beiträge zu einer neuen deutschen Ideologie*, Second Edition, Berlin, 1956, pp. 50-69. Excerpted in P.C. Ludz, editor, *Georg Lukács. Schriften zur Ideologie und Politik*, Neuwied and Berlin, 1967, pp. 330-53.

framework is the not-so-novel one of a contradiction between the 'economic base' and the organizational form of the state. Allegedly critical was the unusual preservation of feudal residues: "In the struggle of monarchical absolutism against the nobility the former is much less developed ... in significant part because that monarchy's ally, the middle class, was much weaker and indecisive. The feudal nobility is therefore much less weakened and beaten, much less formed into a palace nobility (and therefore civilized) than in France; the Prussian nobility retained far more of its feudal agrarian characteristics. This peculiar relation between palace and military nobility on the one hand and pronounced feudal residues on the other constitutes the foundation for the specificity of the Prussian nobility and its relation to the monarchy." (p. 334)

Lukács reiterates that (p. 335): "[...] since in later developments it never came to revolutionary battering of feudalism, this primitive, semi-feudal organizational form of the modern state remained intact even when far higher economic levels were attained [...] the more society developed, the more reactionarily, demoralizingly and grotesquely the backward aspects of this organizational form came to the fore."

And so perpetuation of feudal residues into the modern era seems to be the kernel of Lukács's interpretation of the Prussian state. One can only ask: Whatever happened to the Russo-Mongols? Not a word on Russian co-rule inside Prussia; not a word on direct Russian participation in every major diplomatic decision of the Prussian state, said decisions being the chief activity of said state; not a word on thoroughgoing intergration of Russo-Asiatic mode of production norms in Prussia's 'semi-feudalism'. At first examination Lukács appears to have produced just another Marxist Russo-evasion, albeit one executed with above-average literary finesse. Closer reading reveals however that Lukács had reached into the Marxian conceptual grab-bag of *Russenhass*, pulling out such key notions as East-West struggle, fundamental antinomy of barbarism and civilization and even the paramount Marxian doctrine of integration of a 'foreign body' in the European concert of powers. It must immediately be noted that this is done in the context of a monumental case of displaced aggression in state theory. Lukács applies these concepts against Prussia (not Russia), thereby generating not *Russenhass* but *Preussenhass* ('hatred toward Prussians'). Bakunin's 19th-century concepts of 'German despotism' and 'Prussian despotism', ideas put forth in conscious opposition to the concept of 'Russian despotism' with which Marx conducted struggles in the First International, ride again. Marx's persistent practice of

reading Russia out of the European family of nations is transmogrified by Lukács into an attempt to anathematize *Prussia* from Europe. The Hungarian's most dramatic attempt to ostracize Prussia in 1956 was his description of it as 'a dangerous foreign body in modern civilization' (*einen gefährlichen Fremdkörper in der modernen Zivilisation*). The sentence reads in full: "Then already long before Hitler the truly progress-loving spirits of Europe (including not a few Germans) perceived Prussia in its social, political, moral and cultural essence as a dangerous foreign body in modern civilization." (p. 330)

Lukács's psychological problems with *Preussenhass* have been recently discussed by Sebastian Hafner in Germany and need not detain one here. By way of rebuttal of Lukács's contention that the 'social, political, moral and cultural essence' of Prussia was 'dangerous' and 'foreign' to modern civilization, it might be observed that although reference is made to Bismarck after 1871, the late 19th-century labour movement in 'Prussianized Germany' languishes unmentioned in the narrative. The greatest of the German social-democratic leaders (thus far), August Bebel (d. 1913), clearly recognized that the Prussia of his day represented the greatest concentration of democratic forces of any region on earth. Bebel summed up the situation with the observation 'There are more socialists in Prussia than the rest of Germany combined.' Bebel had his reasons for looking upon the anti-Prussianism of would-be leftists as little short of sophomoric. The superiority of the (overwhelmingly Prussian) German social-democrats in the Second International was by no means limited to numerical superiority; the theoretic sophistication and civility of comportment of the Prusso-Germans made many of the other members (including not a few Frenchmen) look like Neanderthals. Once cut loose from Russian co-rule by Bismarck, it was no other place than Prussia that was the chief situs for development of the pre-War SPD, unquestionably the most intensively democratic and sophisticated labour movement of its day. What needs to be explained is not, as Lukács would have it, the 'undemocratic essence' of Prussianized Germany but rather how, in less than a generation, the transition from Russian co-rule to the most democratic mass movement took place nowhere else but in the Prussian cultural and political realm. Once cut loose from Russian co-rule by Bismarck, it was no other place than Prussia that was the chief situs of development of the pre-War SPD, unquestionably the most intensively democratic and sophisticated labour movement of its day. What needs to be explained is not, as Lukács would have it, the 'undemocratic essence' of Prus-

sianized Germany but rather how, in less than a generation, the transition from Russian co-rule to the most democratic mass movement in the world took place nowhere else but in the Prussian cultural and political realm.

APPENDIX: MARX'S ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN THE 1850'S CONTRA WALTER SCHMIDT

The myth of Marx's organisational inactivity in London in the 1850's is thoroughly institutionalized. It represents a specific form of Russia-evasion in Marxology, namely Urquhart-evasion. According to the myth, after completing some pamphlets dealing with the Colonge Communist Trial in 1852-53, Marx settled down to a long decade of literary preparation and political inactivity until the rise of the First International in the 1860's. Quite in this vein is the comment of Walter Schmidt in 'On the Development and Content of the Concept of the Party in Marx and Engels' [*Über die Entwicklung und Inhalt des Parteienbegriffs von Marx und Engels*²⁵], that "This 'Marx Party of the 1850's [...] was without any (ohne alle) specific organizational affiliations" (p. 127).

In Chapter VII of *Herr Vogt* (MEW, vol. 14, Esp. p. 474) Marx pointed with special pride to a bevy of his specific organizational affiliations in the 1850's, including MP Urquhart, the British Tories in Parliament, Ernest Jones' Chartist movement and an organization known as the Sheffield Foreign Affairs Committee. Marx was so proud of the latter affiliation that he had a commendation to him from the Committee printed as an appendix to *Herr Vogt*. The *class content* of Marx's 1850's special organizational affiliations is decisive. Though there is some joint work with Chartist institutions, the clear thrust of the organizational activity in the 1850's is pan-class *Russenhass* agitation, this a prefigurement of Marx's late 1870's anti-Gladstone campaign. In contradistinction to the assertion of Walter Schmidt (and the considerable literature he cites) that proletarian agitation was the chief focus of Marx's organizational work, there are *two* distinct foci in Marx's organizational praxis. The relation of the two (Pan-class/*Russenhass* and proletarian anti-capitalism) is the real nodal point of the content of the concept of the party in Marx and Engels, a nodal point that remains virtually virgin territory so far as serious discussion is concerned.

Russenhass in Relation to Proletarian Struggle

Several possibilities concerning the relation of the various foci in Marx's organizational concept may be considered. Thus pan-class/*Russenhass*

²⁵ Cf. Beiträge zur Marx-Engels-Forschung. Neue Folge 1994, Hamburg 1994.

agitation by Marx might be looked upon as a sideline activity conducted in anticipation of the ripening of a broader proletarian movement, a sideline activity in any case rendered obsolete by Russia's industrialization and positive integration into the European family of nations. Such an explanation is truly inadequate to explain the quantum of polemical energy Marx expended on anti-Russian agitation, an energy expenditure symbolized above all the 1859-60 decision to shelve *Kapital I* to concentrate and perplexed correspondents of the day such as Peter Imandt and later commentators such as Franz Mehring and Wolfgang Schieder.

A second, much more plausible view of the relation of pan-class/*Russenhass* and proletarian class struggle in Marx's organizational schema is that extirpation of 'the Russian menace to Europe' was a prerequisite to decisively joining the class struggle. This perspective would better explain why *Kapital I* had to make way for *Herr Vogt*.

A third perspective might ask the question: Was pan-class/*Russenhass* agitation conducted to facilitate articulation of class struggle, *or was it the other way around?* Evidence for this third approach would include Helmut Krause's authoritative 1957 work *Marx und Engels und das zeitgenössische Russland*, wherein Marx is attributed the opinion that Russia is the primary or sole buckler of capitalism and that the end of Russian existence would leave the bourgeoisie for practical purpose defenseless. Socialist victory would constitute a 'mopping-up' operation for progressive forces, not a protracted struggle. Why engage in extensive preparation for battle with a virtually disarmed opponent? The 'sole-buckler' view is similar to the 'Russian menace' interpretation in that Russian existence is perceived as blocking human emancipation across the board. The difference, to repeat, is what is perceived as the aftermath of the Russians' demise. On the 'sole buckler' view there would be little left for revolutionary forces to do once Russia was gone. Whatever plausibility this latter viewpoint may hold, there can be little doubt most of the discussion in the concept of the party in Marx and Engels is leaving out an essential ingredient and perhaps the quintessential ingredient - *Russenhass*.

APPENDIX: MARX ON THE BRITISH INDUSTRIAL CAPITALIST STATE IN *KAPITAL*: A NOTE

In Chapter X, 'The Working-Day', Marx discusses limits on the working day, "by forcibly limiting the working day by state regulations, made by a state

that is ruled by capitalist and landlord"²⁶.

The tripartite model of Russian spies and diplomats, a rapidly bourgeoisifying aristocracy and parvenu Manchester Liberal manufacturers has been pared down to a far simpler (and much less accurate) depiction of the industrial capitalist state as one dominated by capitalists and landlords. The utterly distinctive aspect of the state theory in *Lord Palmerston*, the *Revelations* and *Herr Vogt* namely integration of extra-Western forces in the heart of the capitalist state structure, is nowhere to be seen in this passage.

What transforms the quote from an oversight into an analytic regression on Marx's part is *the context* in which it occurs. The statement appears within the context of a discussion of the imposition of Russo-Asiatic relations of production in a European area, i.e., the *Reglement organique* in Rumania (imposed 1831). Marx remounts this hobby horse from *Herr Vogt* to engage in his favorite polemical activity - ridiculing 'Russia' (*Russland*) and Russians (as opposed to Czarism and Czarists). Such a polemic could scarcely come as a surprise from the pen of an identified *Russenhasser*. What *is* surprising is that within the parameters of a typical episode of Russia-bashing, Marx mentions the ruling forces inside the capitalist state and leaves out 'the Mongols', Mongols oh-so-carefully exposed as co-ruling inside the capital - on this lapse by (among other things) stigmatizing veteran British Prime Minister William E. Gladstone as a Russian agent in 1877, a lapse it remains.

Author: William Frederick Drischler, 75/22 Jintakam Lane, Taharn Road, Udon Thani 41000, THAILAND.

²⁶ Cf. MEGA² II/9, Berlin 1990, p. 206.